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**A Turning Point in U.S. Foreign Policy**

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
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***A Turning Point in US Foreign Policy***

**Industrial College of the Armed Forces**

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**12 April 96**

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## **Abstract**

### **Bosnia, A Turning Point in US Foreign Policy**

**by**

**Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Pipp, USAF**

The Balkan crisis is the premier challenge to post Cold War involvement of the US military. While there have been other Operations Other Than War (OOTW), none have been to the extent of current involvement in Bosnia. Both the Congress and the American people have mixed reactions regarding the deployment of US forces to the region. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have changed the attitude of the American public and its Congress. Emphasis has shifted to a focus on domestic problems of the budget, health care reform and entitlements. Budgets across the federal government are being slashed while we proceed to engage in a costly peacekeeping operation which some claim has no bearing on US national interests.

The purpose of this paper is to present an objective view of our involvement in Bosnia, (both pros and cons) and discuss the impact the Balkan crisis has had on US foreign policy. I'll try to convince the reader, that in spite of rational arguments for not participating, the cost of non-involvement could be far greater than we're presently incurring. Near-term domestic concerns cannot and should not be ignored, but strategic thinking requires looking past the present to the long range interests of the country. I hope to make it clear that no nation can serve as the world's policeman yet, the US must "selectively engage" when it is in our best interests to do so. Bosnia is such a challenge.

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## Introduction

A significant historical moment occurred in American foreign policy that has yet to be fully understood or appreciated -- the Balkan crisis. The American public was initially showered with media reports concerning the employment of American military forces in Europe. Earlier, two World Wars had been fought there, American lives were lost, and thousands were injured. This time the drama opens on a mission of peace not war. Although this was not America's first experience with Operations Other Than War (OOTW), it was the largest employment of US military forces ever to be assembled for this purpose. Political analysts, members of the foreign service, politicians, and academicians have all voiced their opinions of American involvement in the Balkans. I thought it was time to hear from John Q. Public.

The purpose of this paper is to express the sentiments of an average citizen regarding America's involvement in the Balkan crisis. Observations, recommendations and conclusions will be based on my perception of public sentiment combined with input from sources knowledgeable of US foreign policy. Why should anyone care about the opinion of the average citizen? Democracies derive their strength from the people and as such, the people possess an immense ability to influence both domestic and foreign policies. Their ability to do so is largely a function of the degree to which they are advised on the issues. While Americans have been categorized as basically uninterested in foreign affairs, I blame this condition not on the people, but the failure of administrations and the media to put issues in terms the general public can comprehend.



Jason Harwood of the Washington Post put it best..."Negative news stories and negative political ads create public cynicism, drive people away from political participation and often confuse them to such a degree that they refuse to vote or even read about politics and government."

Prior to beginning this research, I shared the opinion that US military involvement in Bosnia was an incorrect and/or unnecessary application of American power and influence, that the current administration was on a quest to prove its diplomatic potential, that international programs did not truly represent America's vital interest, and that subjecting American lives to potential hostilities for a "European" problem was unwise at best. In fact, I intended to prove it. However, I now believe, in spite of the difficulty of the decision to become engaged -- it was the right decision.

To convince the reader of my new found position, I'll have to provide a "big picture" or regional view of the problem and identify the US interests which led to our involvement. I'll suggest a common sense approach for arriving at the decision making process and discuss the transition in US foreign policy that has occurred as a result. Finally, I will make predictions of the success or failure of individual events as they unfold in the Balkan crisis.

## **Background**

Opinions are mixed on the degree to which history plays a role in the current Bosnia crisis. After World War I, the Balkans were left with a hodgepodge of nationalities and religious affiliations culminating in the creation of the Kingdoms of Serbs, Croats and

Slovenes. Ethnic strife was temporarily halted by the advancing German invasion of World War II. The Croats sided with the Germans and created the Ustashe movement whose goal included purging the Serbs. Hostilities between the warring Serb and Croatian factions were suspended with the introduction of Josip Broz (Tito) to power. Tito had some interesting pluses on his side; he was both Serb and Croat, and he formally recognized the Muslims as both a political and religious group.<sup>5</sup> When Tito died, hardline Serb and Croat nationalists began their quest for international recognition and power. In spite of the fact that Serbs, Croats and Muslims have lived together for literally centuries, ethnic pride turned into fanaticism as one faction sought to dominate the other. The outgrowth of this predicament led to genocide with each side in the conflict contending that their actions were merely in retaliation for the atrocities of their enemies. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations both tried to intervene but to no avail. The only hope for an effective resolution to this sensitive dilemma included the introduction of a superpower -- enter the United States.

Public sentiment regarding engagement in the Bosnian crisis brought flashbacks of the hard lessons learned during the Vietnam conflict. Circumstances were so similar as to be eerie: difficulty in clearly defining our national objectives; preventing the spread of a conflict; ability of the US to live up to its commitments; and the absence of a clearly defined exit strategy. Even Henry Kissinger categorically emphasized caution in dealing with this sensitive issue:

Secretary Christopher is right to invoke the impact of our consciences of accepting brutality. And yet, when American lives are being risked, American foreign policy must define the national interests being served.... If the US opts for altering the situation on the ground by military means, it will face the dilemma of Vietnam -- an open-ended commitment with no visible exit. If it undertakes a major enforcement role, it will be on the road to an

embarrassment similar to that in Beirut.”<sup>9</sup>

Adding to Kissinger’s sentiments was the former Commander of US Forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland:

**“America should do whatever it can to avoid getting bogged down in another unwinnable war. We have no obligation whatsoever, to commit American soldiers on the ground to a conflict that is ethnic and religious and of which we have no understanding.”<sup>10</sup>**

Westmoreland’s personal experience in Vietnam convinced him that while it took America several years to turn public opinion against involvement in Vietnam -- it would take two weeks in Bosnia.<sup>4</sup> Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, argued that the military should only be used when there is a clear objective, a defined exit strategy and strong public support at home.<sup>11</sup> Critics have argued that none of those conditions exist at present. America’s Vietnam experience had provided a psycho-social roadblock to active involvement.

### **Shades of Vietnam**

The predominate motivation for US military involvement in Vietnam, shared by four presidential administrations, was to stop the spread of communism. Although there are some distinct differences when comparing Balkan and Vietnam circumstances, we shouldn’t overlook the similarities. Hugh M. Arnold conducted a “content analysis” of over 1,000 government documents which, in some form or another, attempted to justify American involvement in the war in Vietnam.<sup>16</sup> The three most important themes underlying US involvement in Vietnam were (in order of importance) 1. Stop the spread of communism 2. Helping other nations maintain their freedom 3. Concern for the

integrity of American commitments. Arnold condensed all rationales for US involvement in Vietnam into other distinct themes which are also reflected in the Clinton administration's National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement: to attain peace and avoid a larger war by stopping it now; the US role as leader of the Free World and the moral obligation stemming from it; the integrity of American commitments; and because our involvement is vital to our security or national interests.<sup>12</sup>

Perhaps the biggest difference in how the two conflicts have been treated is a matter of proportionality. The Clinton administration contends that our level of involvement in Bosnia is proportional to our national interests, i.e. we are trying to stop the spread of war and extensive human suffering . We're doing so by limiting our involvement to stopping the hostilities and trying to successfully settle the dispute diplomatically. Forestalling a wider Balkan War by keeping the fighting out of the regions of Kosovo, Macedonia and Volvodina - whose population's ethnic backgrounds could allow them to expect the support of one or more Balkan nations - has been the most tangible achievement of American diplomacy, a fact that has received little attention by the media.<sup>16</sup>

In Vietnam, the degree of our involvement may have been well out of proportion to our national interests. Vietnam occurred during the Cold War and our adversary was readily resupplied politically and militarily by a major world power. The absence of the Cold War environment allows us to limit our engagement in Bosnia.<sup>13</sup> The Serbs have emerged from the current Bosnian crisis as the primary culprit largely due to the initiation of documented atrocities and their quest for a "Greater Serbia." The Serbs have "moral" support from Russia but not the political and military backing afforded to the North

Vietnamese. Russia remains tied to the Serbs but is trying to simultaneously deal with internal economic and political tensions, their relationship to NATO and the West.

It becomes immediately apparent that in today's environment of international interdependence, the likelihood of large scale political and/or military conflict in one region of the world without impacting another is slim at best. Improvements in communication, transportation, and world economies need to be factored into the internal and external affairs of national entities. A larger view of issues and their impact is required.

### **A Regional View**

No single nation, not even America, can be the world's policeman. We must actively encourage the use of regional organizations to foster peace and economic prosperity in various regions of the world. While the focus of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has changed, NATO can still be the key player in the process. Management of the Balkan crisis by NATO may signal the decline or revitalization of the alliance. Critics have argued that NATO is an organization in quest of a mission and in fact, some have questioned its continued existence. This is an unfair criticism of an organization trying to adapt to a new world environment characterized by the absence of a single dominant threat and the emergence of many unknowns. NATO's center of gravity is moving southwards and its' new military strategy emphasizes mobility and rapid response.<sup>16</sup> The Balkans are proving to be a test bed for NATO's new roles and capabilities.

It is interesting to note that had the Yugoslav crisis occurred several years earlier, the US and its NATO allies would not have hesitated to send military forces to block any Soviet move towards expansion. Several important geopolitical changes have occurred in the Balkans; there is at present no great power rivalry in the region with the potential for igniting a large scale international conflict, political and ethnic fissures have reappeared, and legitimacy of current borders has been placed in doubt.<sup>16</sup> The primary intent of American involvement in the Balkans is not the preservation of NATO. It has repeatedly been stated by several Presidential administrations that US national interests are best served by European (and domestic) security. If we firmly believe that, we need to provide more than lip service to the enduring principles which we steadfastly defend.

In spite of criticisms regarding the effectiveness of the NATO alliance in the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO can make very positive contributions towards regional stability. W. Bruce Weinrod, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for European and NATO Policy from 1989-1993 suggested several steps that address NATO's long term role: make it clear that any expansion of the conflict would constitute a security risk; seek to diplomatically address the refugee issue; keep lines of communications open and make membership in the Partnership for Peace contingent upon enforcement of peace agreements.<sup>16</sup>

National and international interests need to be clearly articulated and understood. I believe there is a strong role for NATO in European stability. However, it needs to guard against "mission creep" whereby a seemingly very limited objective becomes a major military commitment without national and/or international debate.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile,

Americans are entitled to a specific explanation of what and how their national interests are being defined.


### **Defining / Refining US Interests**

What are our interests in the Balkans and how are those interests served by US military forces in the region? A difficult question but one which needs to be clearly articulated if we hope to garner national will. In spite of America's vast power, Americans have a tendency to be pre-occupied with the present. This mindset contributes to frustration on the part of the average American when it comes to foreign policy issues. The Balkan crisis is a classic example. Unless there is a clear and present danger in the near term, support for US military involvement is weak. Consequently, it falls on the shoulders of our diplomats and the Executive Branch to look after the long range interests of the United States. Frequent proclamations that we are the sole remaining superpower suggest to some that there is no credible threat to the US, therefore, we need to turn our attentions inward to domestic issues such as the budget, welfare, medical reform and education. The combined effect of an inward-looking and unilateral US attitude, with weakened support for and credibility of NATO could fragment the Atlantic Alliance, leading to the renationalization of European Security agendas. None of which would be in our national interests.<sup>30</sup>

The definition and articulation of our national interests in Bosnia has been a bone of contention for both the Congress and the American public. The Clinton administration notes that US national interests in Europe are as follows: a stable and secure Europe

achieved through military strength and cooperation; US access to open and vibrant European markets; and, support for the growth of democracy and individual freedoms in central and eastern Europe, especially Russia.<sup>30</sup>

The key to advancing our national interests is global leadership. American power has its limits, and the definition of national interests ought to have discernible parameters.<sup>23</sup> Our strategy acknowledges limitations to American power and calls for “selective engagement” in those challenges most relevant to our interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference.<sup>30</sup> Our national security strategy lays out five specific US policies objectives which are neither unachievable nor unrealistic and



***US Political-Military Objectives in Bosnia***

recognize our responsibilities and limitations.

1. *A political settlement in Bosnia that recognizes the country's territorial integrity.*

While there is much controversy regarding where those borders lie or how they were derived, the fact remains there is an

international agreement recognizing Bosnian sovereignty. Reluctance to follow through with the actions that accompany national recognition portends problems on a grander scale. 2. *Preserving the spread of the fighting into a broader Balkan War that could threaten both allies and the stability of the new democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe.* The consequences of an expanded and protracted war are unequivocal. This consideration alone may be sufficient cause for US involvement. An analogy is the case of the “boiled frog.” If a frog is placed in a pot of boiling water, it will make every effort to



escape. However, as the frog sits in a pot of warm water it feels comfortable and essentially oblivious to its environment. The temperatures then rises to the point where the frog is boiled. Much like the frog, if America fails to react to its environment, the consequences could be severe.

3. *Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees.* Estimates fall as high as two million or more displaced persons as a result of the crisis. These refugees are migrating to neighboring nations placing an economical and political strain on their hosts not to mention the psychological trauma associated with refugee status. As America continues to deal with mass immigration itself, it can surely sympathize with the plight of both the refugees and the gaining hosts.

4. *Halting the slaughter of innocents.* In spite of an array of domestic problems of our own, Americans have a strong sense of moral consciousness. How can we possibly ignore the pain and suffering of victims and families who have endured humanity at its worst? Had even a fraction of the same atrocities taken place in the USA, there would be an outcry like the nation has never heard! Somehow, it's okay if it's on the other side of the world.

5. *Helping support NATO's central role in post cold-war Europe.* It has taken nearly 50 years to develop an international consortium of nations whose primary goal is the preservation of peace. The US has both contributed and benefited from this long standing alliance. As emerging democracies gather momentum, it would unequivocally be in the interest of the US to preserve and support NATO.

US interests need to be conveyed in a form that facilitates action. Presidential Decision Directive 25, (PDD 25), is a major foreign policy pronouncement that sets the tone for future US involvement in peacekeeping operations. PDD 25 was signed by President Clinton on May 3, 1994, and raises a number of broad questions about the future of peacekeeping in US foreign policy; how to define US national interests as they relate to peacekeeping, how to build the necessary congressional and public support for future operations, the use of DOD funds for peacekeeping, the effect of peacekeeping on US military capabilities and the overall status of US international leadership.<sup>18</sup>

The Institute for National Securities Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, developed a table below outlining US involvement in peacekeeping operations and highlights three distinct categories; supporting peacekeeping operations, participating in them, and participating when there is a likelihood of combat.<sup>2</sup> These categories are in consonance with PDD 25 and relate to our national interests. The distinction between the categories makes the following issues apparent: 1.) the US anticipates further involvement in future peacekeeping operations 2.) the US is defining its role and degree of commitment given the circumstances and 3.) the US will not become engaged in every instance of instability. Key concerns of the “don’t go’s” to include cost, readiness, national interests, clear objectives and identification of end-states, have been thought out in advance of participation in any form. PDD 25 mandates improved information to Congress and the public in order to make more informed decisions. The question remains whether or not this effort will enhance or delay key foreign policy decisions.

### **US Peace Operations Policy Guidance**


<b>Factors for Supporting</b>	<b>Factors for Participating in</b>	<b>Factors for Participating</b>
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Peace Operations	Peace Operations	when Operation is Likely to involve Combat
Multilateral Involvement Advances US Interests	Participating advances US Interests	Clear determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives
International Interests in dealing with the Problem multilaterally	Risks to American personnel considered acceptable	Plan to achieve objectives decisively
Conflict reflects threat to or breach of international peace and security	Personnel, funds and other resources are available	Commitment to reassess or adjust size, composition, and disposition of forces if necessary
Operation has clear objectives	US participation deemed necessary for operation's success	
For traditional peacekeeping operation- cease fire is in place	Role of US Forces tied to clear objectives	
For peace enforcement operation- significant threat to international peace and security	Endpoint of US participation can be identified	
Forces, finances and mandate are available	US Public and Congress support operation	
Inaction judged to result in unacceptable political, humanitarian and economic consequences	Command and Control arrangements are acceptable	
Operation's duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria		

## Making an Informed Decision

The decision to employ US military forces in Bosnia has already been made but it's important to understand how the decision was made. Making an informed decision regarding US military involvement in Bosnia means weighing all the pros and cons. Only then can one provide an objective

*Weighing the Factors in the Decision Process*



view of the problem. I put several key factors into a Go - Don't Go category. I'll briefly describe the rationale used by both sides. The difficulty lies in weighing each side of the issue to arrive at a final decision.

**DON'T-GO** The "don't go's" have a list of arguments that run the gamut from renewed interest in isolationism to the impact and cost of American military forces. Many consider Bosnia to be a European problem which they have failed to reconcile on its own. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) tried unsuccessfully to intervene in the crisis. Their failure should not constitute an American responsibility. Likewise, NATO countries need to maintain a level of national and regional power capable of responding to security issues within their own "area of operations." If they prove to be incapable of helping themselves, then injection of American military troops will serve a temporary solution at best. Combat readiness is being sacrificed for peacekeeping which incurs risks disproportionate to our national interests. The Wall Street Journal published the following information in a November 5, 1995 article entitled, "Bosnia; We Shouldn't Go"<sup>17</sup>.

**There are over 20,000 Americans troops deployed to Bosnia with no clear objective, no definition of "victory" and have no defined exit strategy. The US Army has only ten active divisions. The Bosnian deployment could mean that nearly 40% of our Army could be coming, going or on the ground in Bosnia at any one time.**

In an era of ever-increasing budget constraints, cost becomes a critical consideration. In FY94 alone, the US was involved in military commitments in excess of \$1.9B and the cost is likely to be higher if the commitment is extended. While Congress has formally recognized the need for a separate funding line for unprogrammed military operations, the

likely effect is less funds available for infrastructure improvements, force modernization, quality of life improvements and/or other vital domestic programs. It is difficult at best to explain to a Medicare recipient the need to potentially reduce services or benefits while increasing spending on "foreign problems."


The Gulf War was a tremendous military effort that lifted the veil of doubt anyone may have had regarding the capability of US military forces, yet the Vietnam syndrome is slow to die. Over 58,000 Americans lost their lives in a conflict that was little understood, was difficult to correlate to our national interests, was intended to be a short term commitment, and was deemed essential for the US to flex some muscle. Sound familiar? The don't-go's contend we are on the verge of yet another politico-military fiasco headed no where.

GO Much has been said about the cost of US involvement in the Balkans but not much about the cost of non-involvement. Americans have been involved in two World Wars, both on the European continent. While there's a noticeable absence of Soviet superpower support, there is a distinct possibility that ethnic and/or religious elements will try to expand the scope of the conflict throughout the region. The slogan of a popular automotive parts dealer comes to mind -- "pay me now or pay me later". The costs presently being incurred are minuscule when compared to the potential consequences of a protracted conflict. Employment of American forces in a "potentially hostile" environment is profoundly different from a "genuinely" hostile environment. This is not to infer that the Bosnian deployment is not fraught with danger, simply that the nature of the danger differs from that of a full scale combat environment. Stopping the spread of the

war and ensuring regional stability are most definitely in our vital interests. The primary missions of US and Nordic forces present in Macedonia under OPERATION ABLE SENTRY and, on a larger scale, the Bosnian deployment, serve our national interests.

As the sole remaining superpower, the US needs to continue its support of NATO and other regional organizations designed to support world stability. In spite of disagreements and parochialism, it has taken the international community over 50 years to develop an organizational apparatus capable of promoting regional stability. Failure to honor American commitments could very easily lend itself to a downward spiral of American influence in world affairs. Failure to honor worldwide commitments in an era of growing international interdependence could be tantamount to economic suicide.

What kind of message are we sending to potential aggressors and emerging democracies if we fail to intervene? To potential aggressors we're saying its okay to slaughter thousands of innocent victims in the name of nationalism or ethnic pride and to proceed at will. To emerging democracies we're saying there's no need to have moral consciousness and that should you get in a bind, you're on your own as democracy is incapable of responding to a crisis. Neither of these scenarios will promote world stability or American influence in political and economic spheres.




Every aspect of the decision to engage in the Bosnian crisis goes through a continuous cycle of black and white as decisions are influenced by external events. These external forces take many forms to include; time, resources, economy, politics (domestic and international), world events and national will. Tactical battles may be lost along the road to achieving the strategic objective.

Both the go and don't go sectors derive their opinions from their respective frames of reference. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War made it necessary for the US to change its traditional thought patterns and policies. Why abandon a foreign policy process that has served us well for over 50 years? Because the circumstances that led to the development of those policies no longer exists. A new paradigm has been created on the world stage that requires a major policy transition.

### **US Foreign Policy in Transition**

It is interesting to note the dramatic impact the Cold War had on US foreign relations. US foreign policy decisions were made, regardless of the country involved, on the basis of how the two superpowers could jockey for power. Overriding decision criteria had to answer two fundamental questions: would this decision give an advantage to the Soviets and how can we use this decision to over power the Soviets. This is not to suggest that these were the sole criteria, but simply that answers to these questions would have a tremendous influence on the outcome. Operations Other Than War (OOTW), and the Balkan crisis in particular, were the catalyst that compelled the US to change its foreign policy making apparatus. The dissolution of the Soviet Union provided the "why" as the

details of who, what, when and where came into focus. The following diagram represents the change in the foreign policy-making process over the years and the dramatic influence the Cold War had on US foreign policy.



**Cold War Game Plan:** Prior to 1989 when the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled victory in the Cold War, a crises would occur in some part of the world. The US would respond by turning on the “foreign policy making apparatus” fueled by an overwhelming US superpower source. Facts would be fed through a filtering process designed to determine the extent to which the “Soviets” were involved and we’d act accordingly. We were able to retain focus of our efforts through the prism called the instruments of power. The prevailing power base considered political and economic factors but had strong emphasis on the military instrument of power. The result was a foreign policy prescription for handling the crisis. This process was predominantly focused on act-react paradigms of



US-Soviet relations compliments of George Kennan's "X article," and other like minded foreign policy specialists of the time. A distinctive feature was relative swiftness of the decision which involved the potential use of military force. There were a host of pre-defined scenarios involving the use of Soviet military force and its surrogate, the Warsaw Pact. While military planning for eventual scenarios was long in coming, literally generations of US military forces were born and bred on the operations plans that were developed over time. While options were provided, the outcome was somewhat predetermined -- don't let the Soviets take the lead.

**Current Game Plan:** Now we have a transformation in the US foreign policy game plan. As a crisis occurs somewhere in the world, the US turns on its foreign policy apparatus switch fueled by a diminished US superpower base -- reflective of a decline in trade, manufacturing, industrial output and productivity. Given the demise of Kennan's cold war premise, the filtering process has become far more complicated and includes more in-depth concerns about economies, nationalism, and alliances, both political and military. This time, there's been a noticeable shift in the focus of the US power base from military to economic concerns. As the facts pass through the filtering process, a host of possibilities and complications come into play before they even enter the prism of national power. As a consequence, one problem becomes many and the outcome is no longer a policy prescription but a range of options for the Chief Executive to chose from. This process is far more complicated and dynamic then previous foreign policy practices and is far more responsive to the dynamics of the next century. A high ranking senior military officer noted that such a practice was employed in the aborted Haiti operation in minimum

time and was well received by the senior leadership with DOD and the Executive branch. Understanding the genesis of change in the US foreign policy making process, we're now in a position to make predictions.

## **Peering Into the Future**

What does all this hold for the future? The Bosnian decision required our senior leaders to apply a sense of strategic vision and forecast future events. I forecasted the probability of success or failure of various aspects of the Balkan crisis on the illustration below. The predictions are endless. I chose these because they relate to our national interests and have been addressed in some form by PDD 25. Each issue is color coded to indicate the extent to which the event would be favorable (green) or unfavorable (red), and yellow indicates the issue could go either way. The table which follows provides a brief rationale for why events are located where they are on the graph.

Ideally, the goal is for US involvement in Bosnia to result in all issues to be coded green. However, acknowledging the limits of American power, the most we can hope for is that the vast majority of events are favorable to the US. With the exception of a political settlement (coded yellow), I coded green those events/interests particularly linked to the National Security Policy of Enlargement and Engagement. The point is that, at least as of this point in time, we have been largely successful in achieving the objectives we laid out for OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR.



### **Probability Projections - Rationale**

<u><b>ISSUE</b></u>	<u><b>COLOR</b></u>	<u><b>RATIONALE</b></u>
Eliminate Ethnic Hatred	RED	Unlikely that the temporary presence of American forces will achieve this goal
US Military Involvement will last only one year	RED	Already discussion of a potential follow-on contingent to maintain stability
US-Led IFOR leads to lasting peace	RED	Distinct possibility that upon evacuation of US and allied troops, hostilities will recommence.
Costly American Involvement	RED	Nearly \$2B but a fraction of the resource cost of a long term conflict on the European continent
Vietnam Quagmire	YELLOW	Length and casualty dependent; will of American public; 1996 is an election year
Lasting Balkan Peace	YELLOW	Dependent upon ability of leadership in the Balkans to set the stage for co-habitation, economic prosperity and hope; USA and allies will provide the necessary "circuit breakers"
National Will (US)	YELLOW	Resolution of the crisis will set the stage for future US efforts; need to convince USA public of "return on the investment"
Political Settlement	YELLOW	Left to resolve the crisis alone - little hope. Meanwhile, US and allied economic aid for recovery is contingent upon a political settlement involving both sides.
US National Interest Served	GREEN	Maintain global leadership, alliances, trust, and national security
Halt Genocide	GREEN	No reported cases since American involvement
European Pol-Mil Support	GREEN	Not only for this crisis but for others which may arise
Prevent the spread of the war	GREEN	Highly successful aspect of our involvement but not fully appreciated
Stem refugee flow	GREEN	Not only stopped but reversed the flow
US position in NATO enhanced	GREEN	Credibility of American commitments reinvigorated; position as the leader within NATO reinforced

While we certainly can't predict the future we must be prepared to deal with it. Even the most thorough analysis of circumstances can be rapidly overcome by events requiring the foreign policy making apparatus to be reactivated. The environment surrounding the Bosnian crisis is highly dynamic and requires the utmost vigilance on the part of senior political and military leaders. There exists some degree of cautious optimism at this stage of the deployment: there have been no casualties attributed to hostile fire, refugees are returning to their homes, genocide is virtually halted, and, there are some visible attempts by both the Serb and Croatian factions to resolve the crisis.

While there are visible signs of progress, there is cause for doubt. The evacuation of villages has been followed by destruction of homes and businesses, an apparent reflection of the ingrained hatred generated over the years. Opponents of US involvement in the region are convinced that, upon evacuation of the US forces from the region, the atrocities will resume. A single significant emotional event could turn the tide of US and allied efforts. The administration is not naive to think that the mere presence of American forces will resolve the conflict. However, to suggest that US on scene involvement has not contributed at least to the beginnings of a peaceful settlement is an incorrect conclusion at best.

## **Conclusion**

Prior to beginning this research, I was vehemently against US military involvement in Bosnia and I intended to prove the futility of becoming engaged. My sentiments, shared by the vast majority of my colleagues, was first and foremost about people -- the soldiers

sailors, airmen (and their families) that have to endure the physical and mental stress associated with deployment to the region. I was firmly convinced that the US had no bonafide national interests in the Balkans and we were simply flexing our "sole remaining superpower" muscles. I saw vast resources being consumed when they could have been better spent on force modernization, quality of life improvements and deteriorating infrastructures. Perhaps most importantly, I tried to imagine myself explaining to a parent why their son or daughter had been killed or wounded. My compassion for my comrades in arms has not flinched a bit but I have seen another side of this issue -- the strategic one. My view of the issue was nearsighted and I failed to think strategically. It had not dawned on me to think of the consequences of non-involvement. Perhaps our involvement in Bosnia is a cost effective measure both in terms of human lives and resources when compared to the potential consequences of a larger war.

In the end, the security of the United States is inextricably intertwined with the security of Europe. We have learned that when the United States turns its back on European instability, in the long run, we are forced to return at a much greater price.<sup>31</sup> As the President has said since early in 1993, if peace is to be achieved in Bosnia, it will require the participation of NATO; and the United States, as the leader of NATO, must take on this role.<sup>31</sup> Twice in this century we have had to send our troops to fight in Central Europe. We need to make every effort to avoid yet another conflict on a grand scale. As of April 1996, US presence has halted fighting in the region and widespread violence has stopped. Whether or not this is just a temporary situation has yet to be

determined. The indisputable fact is that even a temporary settlement could not have happened without the influence of American power.

The international community will have to face up to basic questions of sovereignty and the rights of ethnic groups.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, there is a strong probability that ethnic-based situations like Bosnia will emerge again. Any disposition of the international community to ignore that trend will yield only more disorder and bloodshed.<sup>6</sup> A strong signal needs to be sent to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia and other potential aggressors that the world will never accept the results of ethnic cleansing and border changes achieved by force.<sup>22</sup> If we do not act and act decisively, history will record that in the last decade of this century the democracies failed to heed its most unforgiving lesson: that unopposed aggression will be enlarged and repeated, and that a failure of will by the democracies will strengthen and encourage those who gain territory and rule by force.<sup>22</sup> Selective engagement and application of our national power are the basis upon which our foreign policy depends. Future foreign policy initiatives need to support and take full advantage of institutions established for the express purpose of ensuring regional stability. Failing to play an integral part in the process is most assuredly against our national interests and would only compel us to act unilaterally.

Once parochialism and emotionalism are removed, it becomes apparent that foreign policy is immensely complex and not the realm of the faint-hearted. The Cold War provided a measure of instability and fear but ironically provided the focus of far more foreign and domestic policies than one would imagine. Likewise, its absence has caused a transformation of the foreign policy process -- development of a range of options for the

Chief Executive in contrast to a pre-determined course of action. This transformation could not have taken place at a better time as we enter a new millennium.

Foreign policy decisions are difficult, unpopular, and could be the rise or fall of an administration. Interdependence of nations is no longer a "good idea," whose undertones were largely political, but has become an imperative. The US has been able to achieve and retain its superpower status through its ability to follow through with its commitments. Failure to do so will cause a downward spiral of US influence that would have consequences far beyond the incident which precipitated it. If we have any aspirations of retaining some form of global leadership, we need to weigh all the consequences of our actions, maintain flexibility by developing a range of alternatives, and finally, make the tough decisions.

When it comes to the average American's view of foreign policy, naiveté reigns supreme. To suggest that merely informing the public makes them aware of all circumstances and therefore willing to actively participate in the process would be a stretch of even the most optimistic person. Administrations will need to inform the public of foreign policy options by answering as simple question -- "why should I care?."

The US cannot become the world's policeman. We need to acknowledge the limitations of our national power. America needs to understand that "superpower" doesn't mean "super hero" capable of responding to any incident of injustice. The phrase "selective engagement" is not only politically palatable, but particularly appropriate as America enters a new century.



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